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Returning Fairness to the Broadcast Media
Milda K. Hedblom*
The Fairness Doctrine has been a cornerstone of federal reg-
ulation of broadcasting for forty years. Yet on August 4, 1987, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) voted to abolish the
Fairness Doctrine on the grounds that it unconstitutionally re-
stricts the freedom of speech rights of broadcast journalists.' This
article will explore the claims of the Fairness Doctrine; evaluate
the recent attack on the Fairness Doctrine; consider the merits of
the argument that broadcasting and the press should be treated as
functional equivalents under the first amendment; identify the na-
ture of the inequalities in access that are likely to develop under a
"Fairness-free" regulatory environment; and recommend legiti-
mate regulatory goals.
Regulation of broadcasting in the United States has a history
that is almost as old as broadcasting itself. The first licensing stat-
ute appeared in 1912.2 After another decade and a half of chaotic,
unregulated spectrum competition, the 1927 Radio Act signalled a
first attempt at more comprehensive regulation of broadcasting.3
That Act soon outgrew its usefulness. The Communications Act of
1934 was enacted in its place but moved far beyond in scope, and
established the present general regulatory framework for broad-
casting and telecommunications. 4
One of the most controversial, interesting, and historically
important regulatory doctrines emerging from the administration
of the Communications Act of 1934 is the Fairness Doctrine. There
are two parts to the Doctrine. As a condition of license to broad-
cast for radio or television reception, broadcasters (1) have a public
obligation to air controversial issues of public importance; and (2)
when they do air controversial issues of public importance, broad-
* Milda K. Hedblom will receive her J.D. from the University of Minnesota
Law School in 1989. She has her Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota in polit-
ical science and is a member of the faculty of Augsburg College, Minneapolis, Min-
nesota, lecturing in politics and media.
1. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, Syracuse, 2 F.C.C.
Rcd. 5043 (1987) (memorandum opinion & order).
2. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 250, 37 Stat. 199 (1912) (amended 1927, repealed 1934).
3. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934).
4. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 Stat. 1064 (1934).
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casters are required to give fair coverage to contrasting view-
points.5 The licensee may choose to personally present contrasting
views or may ask others to do so.6 The same conditions apply to
cable system operators for programs they produce.7 The Fairness
Doctrine does not apply to cable programs which are retransmitted
or produced by members of the public for public access channels.
The Fairness Doctrine applies to overall broadcast content.
For example, it includes coverage of any ballot issue, national and
state issues within localities, and international issues featuring
United States relations or involvement.8 News formats to which
the Doctrine applies include newscasts, news interviews, on the
spot news, and news documentaries. 9 Commercials are exempt,
unless they intentionally present controversial public issues.
In addition, separate rules, developed as off-shoots of the
Fairness Doctrine, pertain to personal attacks and political editori-
alizing. These rules were specifically left in place by the FCC
when it announced the abolition of the general Fairness Doctrine
in August, 1987, but they are likely to be reconsidered.10 The "per-
sonal attack rule" requires a broadcaster attacking any person's
character, honesty, or similar personal quality while airing a con-
troversial issue of public importance in other than bona-fide news
programs, to notify the person, provide a transcript, and offer re-
sponse time." Under the editorializing rule, the station must give
time for contrasting viewpoints if it broadcasts its own position on
an issue, endorses a candidate for public office, or takes a position
on an issue obviously allied to a candidate.' 2
The Fairness Doctrine is important because it involves the
twin purposes of securing citizens' first amendment rights to be in-
formed, and of protecting broadcasters' rights to speak without re-
straint. These rights are fundamental to the existence of an
informed citizenry and a free speech environment.' 3 Whether or
5. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, Fairness Report Regard-
ing Handling of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372, 26,374 (1974) [hereinafter Fair-
ness Report]. The Fairness Doctrine is not an FCC rule but it has the force of
regulation.
6. Id. at 26,374.
7. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, 76.209.
8. Steven J. Simmons, The Fairness Doctrine and the Media 157-60 (1978).
9. Ford Rowan, Broadcast Fairness: Doctrine, Practice, Prospects 7 (1984).
10. Dennis Tells NAB Fate of Fairness Doctrine Rests on Industry Perform-
ance, Comm. Daily, Sept. 22, 1987, vol. 7, no. 183, at 3.
11. Rowan, supra note 9, at 5.
12. Id. at 5.
13. John L. Hodge, Democracy and Free Speech. A Normative Theory of Soci-
ety and Government, in The First Amendment Recondsidered: New Perspectives
on the Meaning of Freedom of Speech and Press 156-61 (1982).
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not the Fairness Doctrine promotes or hinders either has been vig-
orously debated since the policy's inception.14
Proponents of the Fairness Doctrine argue that it also pro-
tects against the creation and/or increase of various inequalities:
inequalities of access for expression of views between owners of
media facilities and non-owners; inequalities of access between
those with means to buy time for advocacy advertising in the me-
dia and those without; inequalities of access for timely response to
personal attack between those who are attacked and owners of me-
dia facilities; inequalities in the capacity to protect oneself from
unwanted messages (such as highly biased messages on public is-
sues) between those who control broadcast messages and those
who receive them.
Assignment of a license to broadcast necessarily creates ine-
qualities in regard to expression of views. All non-speakers are in
a less than equal position compared to those with licenses. But
among the non-speakers, some are less deprived than others. For
example, persons who are politically active, who command social
and economic resources to express views in other channels of com-
munication, and who have acquired the cultural habit of participa-
tion will, in general, succeed in expressing their views through
other means.15 By contrast, people lacking command of psychic
and social resources are deprived of alternative opportunities for
expression and are more heavily burdened by their lack of access
to broadcasting.16 In short, the greatest burden from unavoidable
inequalities in expression of views will be borne by those who are
less educated, less affluent, less informed, less active in public and
community life, and less politically competent. By aiming to en-
hance diversity of viewpoints in the presentation of controversial
public issues, the Fairness Doctrine places a public service obliga-
tion on the broadcaster to actively seek out and present viewpoints
in addition to those which easily find expression, such as a major-
ity view or a well-financed view.
The Political Setting
The assumption that Fairness Doctrine regulation should ap-
ply to broadcasting dominated policy for decades, but by the mid-
14. See Fred Friendly, The Good Guys, The Bad Guys and the First Amend-
ment (1976); Rowan, supra note 9; Lucas A. Powe, Jr., American Broadcasting and
the First Amendment (1987); Simmons, supra note 8.
15. William J. Keefe, Parties, Politics and Public Policy in American 165-69
(1988).
16. Id. at 165-69.
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1980s the concept and its rationale were being strongly opposed.17
The Doctrine evolved through FCC policy statements and court
rulings,'8 and was thought by many to have a statutory basis by
virtue of incorporation into a 1959 amendment to the Communica-
tions Act.19 The Doctrine is difficult to administer and provokes
controversy whatever the political climate.
Support for the Fairness Doctrine rests on the view that it as-
sures access for diverse, contrasting viewpoints. Opponents of the
Fairness Doctrine argue that a superior approach to securing di-
versity in broadcast handling of public issues is to equate broad-
casting with the print press, which is specifically exempted from
Fairness Doctrine-type obligations.20 Under that approach, access
is determined by editorial decisions of the media editor and/or
owner. On the whole the broadcast industry opposes the Doctrine,
though there are some notable exceptions.2 1 Support for the Doc-
trine is found among a wide variety of other interest groups, but
particularly among advocacy, consumer, civil rights, and minority
groups. 2 2
17. See Rowan, supra note 9, at 204-07.
18. In addition to the Fairness Report, supra note 5, the FCC's main policy
statements on the Fairness Doctrine are: The Handling of Public Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communication Act, 58
F.C.C. 2d 691 (1976); Broadcast Procedure Manual, 39 Fed. Reg. 32, 288, 32, 290 pars.
12-14 (rev. ed. 1974); Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Con-
troversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10, 415 (1964); Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
20. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Court held
that a Florida "right of reply" statute was unconstitutional).
21. The Decline and Fall of the Fairness Doctrine, Broadcasting, August 10,
1987, at 27. Westinghouse Broadcasting, one of the largest U.S. media conglomer-
ates, has consistently supported the Fairness Doctrine and expressed its continuing
support in the face of the FCC action.
22. Staff of Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., Groups Supporting Legislation to Codify the Fairness Doctrine
(1987). The following groups are on record supporting legislation to codify the Fair-
ness Doctrine in the 1987-88 Congressional session. Accuracy in Media; Action for
Children's TV; AFL-CIO; American Baptist Churches; American Civil Liberties
Union; American Conservative Union; American Clothing & Textile Workers'
Union; American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees; American
Jewish Committee; American Lung Association; Americans for Democratic Action;
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; Black Citizens for a Fair Media; Center
for Science in the Public Interest; Center for Study of Responsive Laws; Church
Women United; Christian Church (Disciples of Christ); Citizens Communications
Center; Common Cause; Communications Workers of America; Conservative Cau-
cus; Consumer Federation of America; Consumers Union; Department for Profes-
sional Employees, AFL-CIO; Eagle Forum; Environmental Action; Environmental
Policy Institute; Episcopal Church-Office of Communication; Friends of the Earth;
Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment; General Motors; International
Ladies Garment Workers Union; Media Access Project; Mobil Oil Corporation; Mo-
rality in Media of Massachusetts; Motion Picture Association of America; National
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The FCC has usually been a strong advocate of the Fairness
Doctrine and has in the past taken the position that the Doctrine
was "the single most important requirement of operation in the
public interest-the sine qua non for grant of a renewal of li-
cense."23 However, as President Reagan's appointees came to
dominate the Commission in the 1980s, the FCC became the most
pointed critic of the Fairness Doctrine. The position taken by the
Commission in the 1985 Report on Fairness, stood 180 degrees
from their historic defense of the Fairness Doctrine stated plainly
their wish to end the Doctrine.2 4
Despite the obvious desire of the FCC to end the Fairness
Doctrine, the FCC believed that a unilateral deregulatory move
was beyond their reach so long as the Doctrine was understood to
have statutory status and so long as the Doctrine enjoyed powerful
congressional support.25 In Telecommunications Research & Ac-
tion Center v. FC.C.,26 however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
held, in a decision written by Judge Robert Bork, that the Fairness
Doctrine was not a binding statutory directive but, rather, an "ad-
ministrative construction." 27 Following sharply on the heels of
that decision, the claimants in Meredith Corporation v. FCC. chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine before the
same court, appealing from an FCC finding that a violation of the
Fairness Doctrine had occurred. 28 The case was returned to the
FCC with a directive to consider whether the Fairness Doctrine
was "self-generated pursuant to its general congressional authori-
Association of Arab Americans; National Conservative Political Action Committee;
National Council of Churches-Communications Commission; National Education
Association; National Federation of Local Cable Programmers; National League of
Cities; National Organization for Women; National Rifle Association; People for the
American Way; Public Citizen; Safe Energy Communication Council; Seagrams and
Sons, Inc.; Sierra Club; United Auto Workers; United Church of Christ-Office of
Communications; United Food and Commercial Worker International; Upjohn; U.S.
Catholic Conference-Department of Communications; Union of Concerned Scien-
tists; U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
23. Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C. 2d
283, 292 (1970) (Memorandum Opinion and Order). See also Fairness Report, supra
note 5.
24. Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine: Hearings on H.R 1934 Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on En-
ergy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 98 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings on HR
1934]. "On the basis of the voluminous factual record compiled in this proceeding,
our experience in administering the doctrine and our general expertise in broadcast
regulation, we no longer believe that the fairness doctrine, as a matter of policy,
serves the public interest." Id.
25. Hearings on H.R 1934, supra note 24, at 183-202.
26. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 3196 (1987).
27. Id. at 519.
28. 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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zation or specifically mandated by Congress." 29 The court action
enabled the FCC to take radical action at the very moment con-
gressional scrutiny of the Fairness Doctrine intensified.
Congressional views on the Fairness Doctrine tend to divide
depending upon the specific issue raised under the Doctrine's um-
brella, but there is a reservoir of continuing congressional support
for the Doctrine. The actions by the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, affecting the potential status of the Doctrine spurred intense
congressional activity. In the spring of 1987, both houses passed
bills by wide margins, creating a statutory basis for the Fairness
Doctrine.30 President Reagan vetoed the bill, effectively killing it
since congressional override was not very likely. 31
The sequence of events in the courts, in Congress, and at the
White House presented the FCC with an opportunity to alter the
Fairness Doctrine. Under the leadership of the new chairman,
Dennis Patrick, the FCC in August of 1987 announced the aboli-
tion of the Fairness Doctrine on grounds that they believed it to be
a violation of the first amendment.32
Further action from the FCC, in Congress, and in the courts
is inevitable. Several possibilities exist. Congress may fail to res-
urrect the Fairness Doctrine. In that event, the FCC will lead the
redefinition of policy along more de-regulated lines, at least until
the next round of FCC appointments by a new president. More-
over, rules allied to the Fairness Doctrine will be vulnerable and
the public interest standard for award of broadcast licenses will be
redefined.
Another possibility is that Congress will pursue new Fairness
Doctrine legislation, either in traditional or newly-crafted form
and send it to the president in what they hope will be a veto proof
bill,3 3 or perhaps wait until the election of a more sympathetic
president. In the event Congress resurrects the Fairness Doctrine
in some form, a court test of its constitutionality is almost inevita-
ble. Even without a clear congressional mandate on the Fairness
29. Id. at 872.
30. H.R. 1934, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. 4141 (1987). S. Res. 742,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. 5218 (1987). The vote was 302-102 in the
House, 59-31 in the Senate.
31. See President's Message to Congress Transmitting Vetoes, Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc., vol. 23, No. 25, at 715-16 (June 29, 1987).
32. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, Syracuse, 2 F.C.C.
Rcd. 5043 (1987) (memorandum opinion & order).
33. The President does not have the power to veto a particular item while sign-
ing the rest of the bill into law. However, the President took the position that the
Fairness Doctrine provision was unacceptable and Congress agreed to withdraw it,
though promising to reintroduce the measure. The Rise and Fall of the Fairness
Doctrine, Broadcasting, Dec. 28, 1987, at 31.
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Doctrine, it is likely proponents of the Doctrine will seek an op-
portunity to test the constitutionality of the FCC action. The
Supreme Court has signalled a possible willingness to reconsider
the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine,3 4 but the outcome of
possible reconsideration is unclear, especially if Congress has made
it law with or without presidential acquiescence. Whatever the
course of actual events, the Fairness Doctrine will probably be
heard from again.
Broadcasting Regulation: Administrative & Constitutional Bases
The key idea embodied in the Fairness Doctrine-overall pro-
gram balance-reaches back to the adoption of the Radio Act of
1927.m Subsequent legislative history demonstrates a clear, contin-
uous congressional concern for the need to present balanced public
affairs information and to prevent private partisan interests from
propagandizing their own views through their licenses to occupy
the airwaves. 36 Twice in 195937 and 1987, Congress passed Fairness
Doctrine acts but both bills were vetoed. Congress considered em-
bodying the public interest standard in statutory Fairness Doctrine
language at several other junctures, but refrained in order to pre-
serve greater FCC administrative flexibility in implementing the
doctrine.38 Congress did, however, include a specific reference to
the Fairness Doctrine in 1959 amendments to the Communications
Act. This step was interpreted by many, including some courts in
subsequent decisions, to have incorporated the Doctrine into stat-
ute. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals finding in Telecommunica-
tions Research & Action Center that the Doctrine was a regulation,
not a statute, opened the door to intense litigation to sweep the
Doctrine away.39
The recent cases attacking the Doctrine have emphasized
34. Simmons, supra note 8, at 22. There is considerable dispute among scholars
on this point. Some, such as Jerome Barron, believe the FCC tentatively formu-
lated the Doctrine only in 1941. Jerome Barron, The Federal Communication Com-
mission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1969).
Others see the real genesis of the doctrine in the Commission's 1949 Report on Edi-
torializing by Broadcast Licensees 13 (June 1, 1949).
35. Simmons, supra note 8, at 20.
36. Id. at 46-53.
37. Id. at 22-30.
38. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970). Cases which refer to the assumed codification in-
clude Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412
U.S. 94, 129-30 (1973) and Straus Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 530 F.2d 1001 n.11
(D.C. Cir. 1976). The issue of whether the 1959 amendment created a statutory ba-
sis for the Fairness Doctrine was not an issue specifically decided by either of these
cases. The cases do indicate the trend of judicial thinking on the matter.
39. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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congressional failure to unequivocally write the Doctrine into stat-
ute as evidence that Congress has permitted but not required the
Fairness Doctrine. 40 The success of that argument may reflect less
its ultimate strength than the current ideological make-up of the
FCC leadership and unusual judicial receptiveness. A more accu-
rate reading is that Congress failed to create a statute before 1987
out of deference to the FCC's role in developing detailed policy.
The failure was also a result of concern for the complexity of the
issues raised by a Fairness Doctrine-type requirement.4 1 It is ap-
parent from the record that Congress has worried consistently
about problems of distortion from a completely unregulated broad-
casting industry, though preferring that solutions be worked out
among the FCC, the industry, and interested public groups.42 This
reading is supported by the fact that, in the spring of 1987 when
the Fairness Doctrine seemed likely to fall before a combined judi-
cial and administrative attack, Congress speedily passed a bill to
protect the concept.
The constitutional development of the Fairness Doctrine in-
volved close interaction between the FCC and two courts, the
Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court. The key
event in that development is the Supreme Court's declaration of
the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine in the 1969 Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FC.C. case. 43 The recent cases from the D.C.
Circuit discussed above, included successful frontal attacks on Red
Lion and the Fairness Doctrine.
The Red Lion case arose from a fifteen minute broadcast by
Rev. Billy Hargis, a political preacher doing a "Christian Crusade"
series for Red Lion Broadcasting Company. His presentation fea-
tured a discussion of a book written by Fred J. Cook about Sen.
Barry Goldwater. The broadcast occured in November of 1964.
Hargis said that Cook had been fired by a newspaper for making
false charges against city officials; that Cook had then worked for
a Communist-affiliated publication; that he had defended Alger
Hiss and attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the Central Intelligence
Agency; and that he had now written a "book to smear and destroy
Barry Goldwater." 44 Cook concluded he had been personally at-
40. Brief for Petitioners at 54, Radio-Television News Directors Association v.
F.C.C., 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This case is a companion case to Meredith Cor-
poration v. F.C.C., 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This argument necessarily requires
that one ignore the recent adoption of the Doctrine by substantial margins in both
congressional bodies.
41. Simmons, supra note 8, at 22-58.
42. Id. at 22-59.
43. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
44. Id. at 371.
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tacked and demanded free reply time, which the station refused.
The FCC declared that the Hargis broadcast was a personal
attack on Cook and that the station had failed to meet its fairness
obligatons.45 On appeal, the Supreme Court not only affirmed the
decision of the FCC but also addressed the broader role of the
Fairness Doctrine within the constitutional framework of the first
amendment. The Court asserted that two rules related to the
Fairness Doctrine, the personal attack and political editorializing
rules, fell within the constitutional ambit of the Fairness Doctrine
itself.46 The Court observed that the public has a right of access to
diverse ideas in broadcast content; a right which may not be consti-
tutionally abridged and which is dominant over broadcasters'
rights.47
The basis for this view is that the public has a "collective
right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and
purposes of the first amendment." 48 Among those purposes is the
contribution to self-government. The Court explicitly linked pro-
vision of information on controversial public issues to self-govern-
ment in its statement that "[S]peech concering public affairs is
more than self-expression, it is the essence of self-government." 49
The broadcaster's unsuccessful primary argument against the
Fairness Doctrine in 1969 rested on first amendment grounds.
This is the same challenge that persuaded the FCC in its adminis-
trative attack on the Doctrine. The essence of the challenge is that
no person's freedom to speak or publish can be restricted in order
to provide time or space for the views of one's opponents. It is
claimed that this right of broadcasters is violated by the Fairness
Doctrine. Broadcasters also assert that the Fairness Doctrine has
the perverse effect of depressing broadcasters' willingness to pres-
ent controversial public issues. The Red Lion Court unequivocally
rejected this claim. At the same time, the Court indicated that if
this effect developed in the future, "there will be time enough to
45. Considerable emphasis is now placed on the likelihood that the complaint in
Red Lion arose out of political efforts centered in the Kennedy/Johnson teams.
These efforts were focused on identifying possible fairness complaints and bringing
them to the attention of those individuals entitled to bring an action at the FCC.
Friendly, supra note 14. That effort is cited as 'proof' that the Fairness Doctrine
was being used as a tool of political harassment. Powe, supra note 14, at 113-20.
However, it is the purpose of the Fairness Doctrine to correct significant content
imbalance regardless of how that imbalance was identified. The complaint about
harassment seems to be a complaint that the Fairness Doctrine can work at all.
46. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
47. Id.
48. Id.




consider the constitutional implications."5 0 The Court went on to
note in Red Lion that broadcasters were on somewhat dubious
grounds in advancing that claim, because they were already "...
obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great
public concern." 51
The Fairness Doctrine and Protected Interests
The model of broadcast regulation from which the Fairness
Doctrine derives differs sharply from the government's role in reg-
ulating the press. The first amendment has been read so as to
leave the print editorial process virtually inviolate.52 By contrast,
broadcasting is regulated. Broadcasters hold a license under an ob-
ligation to serve the public interest. The FCC has elaborated nu-
merous specific requirements for a broadcasting license, including
the Fairness Doctrine obligation to devote a reasonable amount of
time to public issues and present conflicting viewpoints. The print
editor is accountable mainly through the laws of libel and slander.
The broadcasting editor is accountable not only through those
laws, but also through FCC rules and the need for regular license
renewal.5 3
The foremost rationale for regulating broadcast media
through the Fairness Doctrine is the argument that the spectrum
is scarce, i.e., the electromagnetic spectrum cannot accomodate all
who might wish to use it.54 Therefore, those few who do receive a
license must serve some interests of the many non-speakers who
are barred, even while they further their own interests. This ra-
tionale is inapplicable to the print media because additional voices
can always enter that forum of expression, regardless of the
number already actively using print.55
A second evolving rationale for regulating broadcasting, but
not print media will likely become increasingly important in fu-
ture policy making decisions.56 This rationale argues that regula-
tion is justified because broadcasting has a unique impact and
pervasive presence in people's lives that is different from print me-
50. 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969).
51. Id. at 394.
52. Some commentators have argued that print editorial rights may prevail
even over speech rights. See Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redun-
dancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech? 26 Hastings L. J. 639 (1975).
53. David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media'"--New Direc-
tions in Regulating Telecommunications, in Free But Regulated: Conflicting Tradi-
tions in Media Law 52, 53 (Daniel Brenner & William Rivers eds. 1982).
54. Simmons, supra note 8, at 41.
55. Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 632 (1970).
56. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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dia. That difference undermines assumptions about freedom of
choice which pertain to speech in other forms of media.57 How-
ever, the current attack on the Fairness Doctrine centers on the
scarcity rationale which will be considered below.
The Attack on the Fairness Rationale
Red Lion looked to the spectrum rationale for justifying re-
straints on licensees under the Fairness Doctrine. "Where there
are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridge-
able First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right
of every individual to speak, write, or publish."5 8 Those who do
broadcast can be required to share the frequency and present
views of others which would otherwise be barred.59 In the recent
deregulatory developments, both the Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir-
cuit, and the FCC argue that the factual underpinning for the ra-
tionale of spectrum scarcity which justifies a different first
amendment position for broadcasting than for the press has been
undermined since Red Lion.60
When Is Spectrum Space Scarce?
Has the technological predicate of content regulation been
undermined since Red Lion? In its action ordering the end of the
Fairness Doctrine, the FCC cited multiplication of broadcast and
radio outlets, and growth of new types of media outlets (such as
cable, low-power television, satellite to home service, teletext,
video-text) as curing the Supreme Court's concern for access and
diversity.61 "The Commission found in recent years that there had
been an explosive growth in both the number and types of outlets
providing information to the public. Hence, the Supreme Court's
apparent concern that listeners and viewers have access to diverse
sources of information has now been allayed."62
This line of reasoning assumes that the meaning ascribed to
spectrum scarcity in Red Lion is a form of numerical scarcity. This
57. Id. at 748.
58. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1967).
59. Id. at 389.
60. Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. F.C.C., 801 F.2d 501,
508 (D.C. Cir. 1986) rehg denied en banc, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert de-
nied 107 S.Ct. 3196 (1987); Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH,
Syracuse, 2 F.C.C. Red. 5043 (1987) (memorandum opinion and order).
61. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C. Red. 5043,
5053 (1987) (memorandum opinion and order).
62. Id. at 5053.
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was based on the fact that historically, and at the time of the deci-
sion, broadcast media outlets were less numerous than print out-
lets. The number of outlets, however, is not critical to the
meaning of the rationale. An absolute increase in the number and
types of media outlets does not address the first amendment con-
cerns of Fairness Doctrine broadcast regulation.63 The underlying
concern is to set a public standard for all license holders, be they
few or many, so as to discourage biased presentation of public is-
sues. A few "fair" broadcasters cannot carry the burden for other
"unfair" broadcasters.
Nothing in the Red Lion approach suggests that sheer in-
crease in the number of broadcaster voices will assure access of
viewpoints on issues other than those of the broadcaster. Stated
differently, nothing in the Red Lion opinion suggests that the
Court viewed the relatively small number of broadcaster voices as
the chief obstacle blocking broadcast of diverse viewpoints on con-
troversial issues. The chief obstacle arises from the fact that
broadcaster voices, whatever their actual number, are a dispropor-
tionately small number of voices in relation to all those who wish
to speak. The Court's interest in numerical scarcity arose from its
wish to avoid the possiblity that a small number of broadcasters
could unfairly use the airwaves to advance their personal interests.
This concern was unacceptable in view of the additional fact that
use of the airwaves is a publicly-granted right given to some but
denied to others.64
Furthermore, it can be argued that rather than resolving the
access and diversity concerns reflected in the Fairness Doctrine,
the multiplication of outlets and media system may, under certain
circumstances, increase them. If each person obtains information
from dozens of media sources, and if all operate without a public
interest standard of unbiased presentation of public issues, the
chances of arriving at a decision on public issues which has been
informed by unbiased information are porportionately lessened.6 5
Whether or not one accepts the view that increase of media outlets
can potentially increase the injury to citizens from biased informa-
tion, this analysis shows that numerical scarcity should still be a
matter of concern to Congress or to future courts considering the
fate of the Fairness Doctrine.
Another form of spectrum scarcity is allocation scarcity,
63. Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 661-62 (1970).
64. See id. at 661-64.
65. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Fairness in
Broadcasting Act of 1987, S. Rep. No. 34, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 14-15 (1987) [herein-
after Senate Comm. Rep.].
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which refers to the number of available licenses relative to de-
mand. Numerical scarcity analysis examines the number of broad-
cast outlets to which viewers have access. Allocation scarcity
analysis considers whether demand for spectrum space by those fi-
nancially and technically equipped to use the airwaves exceeds
supply. At any given point in time, access to the electromagnetic
spectrum must necessarily be allocated to some but denied to
others in order for communication to take place at all, due to the
physical limitations of the electromagnetic spectrum.66 Whatever
principle of allocation is adopted, some people in a community will
have access to the airwaves to amplify and extend the range of
their messages, while others will not. The need for allocation
means spectrum scarcity exists, and will persist.
A direct measure of demand is the economic value of the li-
cense reflected in the prices paid for broadcast properties. Major
market television stations with VHF licenses sell for half a billion
dollars.67 These prices include a huge premium resulting from the
scarcity of spectrum space.
A different indicator of scarcity is the existence of intense
competition among applicants when hearings are held for granting
new station licenses. The FCC claim in the 1985 Fairness Report
that vacant channels prove a lack of scarcity is not supported by
analysis of its own data on competition among applicants for
licenses.68 Further, in other contexts the FCC itself has agreed
that there is a scarcity of spectrum. In a proceeding on FM subsid-
iary allocation, a type of allocation which would allow FM stations
to re-cycle some of their assigned but unused spectrum area for
special services such as private beepers, the Commission stated
"[T]he public's need for new or additional services must be bal-
anced against the limited spectrum available."69 Other examples
66. "Nevertheless we recognize that technological achievements and the trans-
formations of the telecommunications market described above have not eliminated
spectrum scarcity." Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, Syracuse,
2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, (1987).
67. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Fairness in Broadcasting Act of
1987, H.R. Rep. No. 108, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1987) [hereinafter House Comm.
Rep.].
68. Id. at 13, 15. In November 1986, the Commission had 142 pending compara-
tive proceedings involving multiple applicants for broadcast facilities. Moreover,
many of these proceedings, particularly those for facilities in major markets involve
large numbers of applicants. For example, there were 47 applicants for a single FM
radio channel in Orlando, Florida. The claim that large numbers of FM radio chan-
nels were vacant rested largely on the creation of 689 new channels in 1985.
69. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65, at 21 (quoting FM Subsidiary Communi-
cations Authorizations, 55 RR 2d (P&F) 1607, 1613 n.19 (1984), rev'd sub. nom. on
other grounds, California v. F.C.C., No. 85-1112 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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of spectrum shortage are the fierce battles before the FCC among
competing claims for -the same spectrum space by cellular radio
users, land mobile service providers, public safety officials, and
proponents of a mobile satellite service.70
Ironically, the very same broadcast industry that argues un-
blushingly against spectrum scarcity in Fairness Doctrine battles,
vigorously contends on other issues that spectrum space is scarce.
They make such a claim in connection with their demand that no
further allocation of UHF frequencies to land mobile services
should be made because the expected development of an improved
television signal capable of producing a vastly sharper screen im-
age. The broadcast industry argues that this new technology,
known as "high definition television" or HDTV, will require large
amounts of new spectrum space. 71
The remarkably durable nature of allocation scarcity can be
illustrated with an example which shows that even with unlimited
economic resources the problem of making room for everyone on
an inherently limited spectrum of airwaves requires a standard of
allocation and assignment of specific frequencies for particular
uses. Assuming that all economic barriers to acquiring the basic
resources needed to publish a newspaper were removed, everyone
who wanted to publish would be able to do so. Conversely, assum-
ing that all economic barriers to acquiring the basic resources
needed to broadcast were removed, not everyone who wanted
would be able to broadcast. The Washington, D.C. area provides a
demonstration of the difference at issue. A major new daily news-
paper, the Washington Times, began publication within the last
few years. Other than finances, no barriers stood in the publisher's
way. At the same time it was not possible to start a television sta-
tion in Washington, D.C. since no vacancy existed in the broadcast
market.
The type of scarcity involved in allocation scarcity is non-eco-
nomic and cannot be solved merely by introducing more economic
goods of one kind or another, a solution that works for many other
types of scarcity. The non-economic nature of allocation scarcity
was misunderstood by Judge Robert Bork in Telecommunications
Research & Action Center7 2 :
It is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce but it
is unclear why that fact justifies content regulation of broad-
casting in a way that would be intolerable if applied to the edi-
torial process of the print media. All economic goods are
70. Id. at 22.
71. Broadcasting, October 12, 1987, at 36.
72. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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scarce, not least the newsprint, ink, delivery trucks, com-
puters, and other resources that go into the production and
dissemination of print journalism... Since scarcity is a univer-
sal fact, it can hardly explain regulation in one context and not
another.
The attempt to use a universal fact as a distinguishing
principle necessarily leads to analytical confusion.73
This opinion attempts to use a general economic principle as
a solution to a non-economic problem, which leads to analytical
confusion. Allocation scarcity is not an economic problem; it is a
problem about reciprocal obligations among those who have, in
principle, an equal claim to community resources, once the deci-
sion is made to hold those resources outside the private property
system. The problems of allocation scarcity and sorting out the
mutual obligations between licensees and non-licensees arises from
the decision to retain the airwaves as a community resource.74
The claim made in the Telecommunications Research & Ac-
tion Center opinion, that spectrum scarcity does not justify differ-
ent first amendment treatment of broadcasting because it is like
scarcity of all other economic goods, fails because, as shown above,
the spectrum is unavoidably scarce. Yet that decision is the only
clear statement from a court supporting the FCC's determination
that the spectrum scarcity rationale is no longer a basis for distin-
guishing the print and broadcast media under the first amend-
ment. Both congressional committees reporting bills in 1987 to
make the Fairness Doctrine law specifically rejected the spectrum
scarcity view in Telecommunications Research & Action Center. 75
In summary, there is serious doubt cast on the claim that in
the 1980s spectrum scarcity is insufficient to justify the goals of the
Fairness Doctrine. Allocation scarcity is genuine and inherent in
broadcasting. Multiplication of the number of broadcaster voices
does not itself produce diversity of viewpoints in presentation of
controversial public issues. Therefore, the number of outlets is ir-
relevant to the goals of the Fairness Doctrine. Treating the broad-
cast industry differently under the first amendment is a reflection
of continuing real differences between print and broadcast media.
The Public Interest Standard and the Fairness Doctrine
The essential basis of broadcasting is that broadcasters re-
ceive the license to broadcast for free even though a license is a
73. Id. at 508.
74. See Powe, supra note 14, at 201.
75. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65, at 3; House Comm. Rep., supra note 67,
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valuable public resource, on the strength of which broadcast facili-
ties acquire market value. It is well-established that, as a conse-
quence, licensees may constitutionally be required to act in the
public interest.76 The Fairness Doctrine has been widely viewed as
a reasonable condition to impose on the use of that valuable public
resource.77 The interests to be served by the doctrine are those of
the public. These interests include the right to be reasonably pro-
vided with unbiased information on controversial public issues. A
clear judicial expression of the public interest standard is found in
the 1969 Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
F CC. case:
By whatever name or classification, broadcasters are tempo-
rary permittees-fiduciaries--of a great public resource and
they must meet the highest standards which are embraced in
the public interest concept. The Fairness Doctrine plays a
very large role in assuring that the public resource granted to
licensees at no cost will be used in the public interest.78
It is reasonable for the government to establish expectations
of broadcasters, such as the public interest standard and the con-
comitant Fairness Doctrine, because the government played the
crucial role in the first instance to insure that airwave use would
be immensely profitable. The extremely high profitability of
broadcasting in the United States depends on the authorization of
only a limited number of full power stations. Congress could have
chosen other plausible options. One example is providing broad-
cast rights and access to a far greater number of people. Each
broadcaster, however, would have a much smaller audience and
margin of profit. Another option is to create a common carrier
video programming service with no licensee control of content,
similar to telephone service.79 The decision instead to award free
licenses to a few who control most program content in order to
maximize profit became a valuable privilege, but one which is con-
ditioned on reciprocity with the public. "The doctrine serves as a
surrogate for other methods of licensing that would have permit-
ted more people to own stations... By codifying the Fairness Doc-
trine, the Committee intends to preserve this original allocation of
rights and responsibilities."80 The Fairness Doctrine expresses
76. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
77. Congress has repeatedly expressed this view, most recently in the 1987 pas-
sage of the bill intending to make the Fairness Doctrine law. Judicial approval for
this core concept of fairness was first expressed in Great Lakes Broadcasting Com-
pany, Federal Radio Commission Third Annual Report 33 (1929).
78. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 425 F.2d.
543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
79. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65, at 13.




The reciprocal relationship between the broadcast public and
the broadcaster raises some distinctive first amendment rights con-
cerns in light of the public interest standard in broadcasting.
These concerns were analyzed in Red Lion, the case in which a
unanimous court upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness
Doctrine.81
By Red Lion analysis, governmental rules can promote rather
than inhibit free speech, and sometimes government action is per-
missible to preserve attributes of the marketplace of ideas. The
view that the goals of the first amendment in the area of broad-
casting might be realized through affirmative action by public au-
thority on behalf of the public reflects a rich, complex view of
speech rights in a democratic society.8 2
The philosophical strands in the analysis include, but go be-
yond, the process of balancing one citizen's claims against those of
another. The analysis asserts a link between preservation of an
open, non-monopolistic marketplace of ideas and a permissible role
for government in maintaining access to a variety of viewpoints in
the media. It asserts a first amendment free speech interest in the
conditions which support and/or limit debate and discussion of
public issues. It allows for the possibility that there is an impor-
tant "community interest" in free speech, as well as an individual
interest, to be protected under the first amendment.8 3
Another intriguing implication of the first amendment analy-
sis in Red Lion is that it suggests that the meaning of the first
amendment for broadcasting needs to be assessed according to
characteristic aspects of the medium. The characteristic aspect of
the medium of particular concern in Red Lion is spectrum scarcity
and the obstacles it poses to those who might wish to use the air-
waves. Later, in FC.C. v. Pac fica Foundation,84 a different char-
acteristic of broadcasting was emphasized by the suggestion that
ties but use of them would be determined by some combination of price and queue
principles, and, except for decency standards, broadcasters would have no choice
among users or responsibility for the content, as now happens with telephone use.
A limited analogy would be to the public access channels of the cable-casting
system.
81. 395 U.S. at 367.
82. "There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself
as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves." Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367, 389. "It is the right of the view-
ers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id. at 390.
83. Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 627-29 (1970).
84. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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the pervasiveness and high impact of broadcaster messages may be
a basis for limitation to some extent of broadcaster first amend-
ment rights.8 5 This approach suggests that messages from all
forms of media are not equal; the potential impact of those from
broadcast media are greater than others. Therefore, broadcast me-
dia may require treatment different from the press under the first
amendment in order to protect some important first amendment
rights of the public intended to receive those messages.
Fairness: Does It Serve Or Disserve Access and Diversity?
The Fairness Doctrine aims to enhance access for public is-
sues and diversity of opinion by requiring broadcasters to provide
contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues of public impor-
tance. The FCC contends in its 1985 Fairness Report that the Fair-
ness Doctrine disserves the interests of the public by failing to
enlarge access and diversity. At the same time, it perversely chills
the speech of broadcasters through inhibiting broadcasters from
airing material because they would then have to permit others to
respond.8 6
The policy aims of the Fairness Doctrine were not developed
in a vacuum. As discussed above, the aims were to some extent in-
herent in the public interest standard and a subject of congres-
sional discussion on broadcasting from the inception of broadcast
regulation. However, experience with broadcaster behavior has
also provided a basis for development of the idea that the Fairness
Doctrine has a role to play in fostering responsible broadcaster be-
havior. The most well known cases of extreme abuse stem from
the early history of broadcasting when ideas among broadcasters
regarding responsibilities of broadcast ownership or editing were
undeveloped.8 7 Broadcasters and the FCC maintain that the in-
dustry is now mature and that its own standards protect the inter-
ests to be served by the Fairness Doctrine goals.
Perhaps it is unlikely that a completely deregulated broad-
casting mileau would allow a modern day equivalent of Dr. J. R.
Brinkley, who tempted the male public with an irresistible offer of
renewed sexual potency from transplanted goat gonads, an offer
which made him a wealthy man by the late 1920s.8 8 Fairness Doc-
trine complaints now are likely to involve more sophisticated is-
85. Id. at 748.
86. Hearings on H.R 1934, supra note 24, at 181.
87. Powe, supra note 14 at 30.
88. Id. at 22-27.
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sues such as those in Meredith Corporation v. FCC89 in which the
FCC found a violation of the Fairness Doctrine.90 The station,
WTVH in Syracuse, New York, had accepted and aired 187 min-
utes of paid commercials supporting the building of a controversial
nuclear power plant, but had played only 22 minutes opposing its
construction.9 1 This was a violation under the Culman rule of the
Fairness Doctrine requiring free response time for paid commer-
cials on controversial public issues when no other balancing pro-
gramming is intended. The broadcaster behavior in that case
illustrates one type of disparity the Fairness Doctrine is designed
to correct.
The 1985 Fairness Report is the key building block of the cur-
rent effort to put an end to the doctrine. While this report does
not stand alone as a critique of the doctrine or some of its as-
pects,92 it does stand alone in the extreme, negative character of
its conclusions. This is especially true in view of the tenuous fac-
tual base supporting those conclusions. Both the Report from the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation pre-
pared in conjunction with its 1987 Fairness in Broadcasting Act
and by the Report from the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce prepared in conjuction with its 1987 Fairness in Broad-
casting Act, directly challenge the validity of the evidence and con-
clusions of the 1985 Fairness Report.93
The persuasiveness of the FCC document depends upon the
evidence offered in support of its conclusions. Both congressional
committees reject the evidence, not only as to its weight, but also
as to its probative value and, in some cases, its veracity. The
House Committee Report says "[Tihe Committee has fully consid-
ered the Commission's Report and find that the Commission's con-
clusions are factually flawed, are based on erroneous legal
analysis, and are entitled to no deference."'9 4
The Senate Committee Report referred to Chairman
Fowler's "grossly distorted" testimony regarding the Fairness Doc-
trine at work.95 It also referred to the lack of "detailed and well-
documented evidence" to support the alleged chilling effect of the
doctrine and asserted that the Commission in its Report, "failed to
89. Meredith Corporation v. F.C.C., 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
90. Id.
91. House Comm. Rep., supra note 67, at 22-23.
92. Daniel L. Brenner and William L. Rivers, Free But Regulated: Conflicting
Traditions in Media Law 55-60 (1982).
93. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65; House Comm. Rep., supra note 67.
94. House Comm. Rep., supra note 67, at 5.
95. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65, at 28.
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discuss realistically, much less weigh, evidence" in its own record
demonstrating the positive use of the Fairness Doctrine.96
One of the key conclusions of the FCC 1985 Fairness Report
is that the Doctrine overall lessens the flow of diverse viewpoints.
Several factors brought forward by the congressional committees
undermine this conclusion. Charles Ferris, FCC Chairperson from
1977-1981, testified that he found "no credible evidence of a chil-
ling effect" during his tenure. 97 Yet much of the evidence cited by
Chairperson Fowler as examples of intimidation of broadcasters
through use of Fairness Doctrine rules spanned the fifteen years
proceeding 1980 and Mr. Fowler's tenure as chair.
Arguing against the recent FCC conclusion is the fact that
similar major reports on the Fairness Doctrine were undertaken in
197498 and 1979,99 and both found that the Doctrine substantially
increased opportunities for speech through the broadcast media.l0 0
The 1985 Fairness Report simply ignored previous findings and in-
vestigations, and its failure to indicate in what way conditions had
changed to produce such stark differences in less than five years
contributes to the flaws in the report.
One of the most peculiar aspects of the use of evidence in the
1985 Fairness Report is that numerous groups and individuals pro-
vided testimony that the Fairness Doctrine had provided signifi-
cant opportunities for insuring coverage of contrasting viewpoints
on controversial public issues, especially through informal negotia-
tions with broadcasters.' 0 ' Through such negotiations, groups se-
cured free and paid advertising time, as well as opportunities to
appear on news programs and talk shows for viewpoints which
broadcasters had not previously covered or did not intend to cover.
This process and its result is consistent with the policy goals of the
Fairness Doctrine. In fact, the groups and individuals who testified
before the Commission praised both the Fairness Doctrine and
broadcasters for the mutual success in making the policy work.10 2
96. Id. at 30.
97. Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987. Report From the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, supra note 67 at 19.
98. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
99. Report & Order, 74 F.C.C.2d 163 (1979).
100. Fairness Report 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 28-29 (1974); Report and Order 74 F.C.C.2d
163, 170-71 (1979).
101. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65, at 27-28.
102. Id. at 28. See, e.g., Comments of Media Access Project and Telecommunica-
tions Research and Action Center (in Gen. Docket 84-282) filed September 6, 1984;
Comments of Henry Geller and Donna Lambert (in Gen. Docket 84-282) filed Sep-
tember 6, 1984. See also Letter to Chairman Mark Fowler from Safe Energy Com-
munication Council, March 4, 1987 (describing case histories involving stations in
over 14 states showing how "smoothly the Fairness Doctrine operates in practice").
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Yet the 1985 Fairness Report took precisely that testimony
and, in the view of the Senate Committee, "twisted those com-
ments to turn them into instances of alleged 'intimidation' of the
broadcasters by the very public the broadcasters are licensed to
serve."10 3 From this same testimony the report claims seventy-five
anecdotes about shake-down and intimidation.104 These claims
have been widely disseminated in subsequent Commission state-
ments and reports, as well as in litigation briefs.105
The last major claim of the Commission is that the Fairness
Doctrine produces a chilling effect on the activities of broadcasters.
The evidence for this effect derives from anecdotal claims by
broadcasters about avoiding controversial material they claim they
otherwise would have broadcast in order to avoid incurring an ob-
ligation for reply time for contrasting viewpoints. 0 6 This is a com-
plaint that makes a case for maintaining rather than eliminating
the Fairness Doctrine since the obligation to provide reply time
only arises if the coverage has been biased. If broadcasters have
avoided airing controversial material, a question the 1985 Fairness
Report did not investigate, it is more likely a result of competitive
pressure for more profitable use of time or a wish to avoid irritat-
ing viewers or listeners.'0 7
Another way in which the Fairness Doctrine is alleged to
chill broadcaster coverage is the claim that broadcasters' fear
forced expenditure of large sums of money and time handling
Fairness Doctrine complaints. Therefore, in an effort to avoid
such possible costs, broadcasters claim they actively avoid contro-
versial material.1 08 To put that claim into perspective, it is helpful
to consider the actual number of Fairness complaints which reach
broadcasters from the FCC.
During the six years that Chairperson Fowler has been at the
Commission, only one Fairness decision resulted in litigation, the
now famous Meredith case. 10 9 In 1984, 1985, and 1986, somewhere
between five thousand to seven thousand complaints arrived at the
FCC, and typically six (as in 1986) were passed on to the broad-
103. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65, at 28.
104. Id.
105. See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligation of Braodcast
Licensees, FCC Mass Media Docket No. 87-26 (August 4, 1987) par. 151; Brief for
Petitioners at 38-39, R.T.N.D.A. v. F.C.C., 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
106. Hearing on H. 1934, supra note 24 at 124-25.
107. Id. at 117-18.
108. House Comm. Rep., supra note 67, at 23.
109. Meredith Corp. v. F.C.C., 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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casters."l 0 The evidence offered to support the claim of a signifi-
cant chill consisted solely of broadcaster anecdotes."1 There was
no detailed or documented evidence presented. Furthermore,
problems with the broadcaster anecdotes in the hearing record un-
dermined the Commission's own position.
The chill evidence relies heavily on anecdotes from one
source, the National Association of Broadcasters, who alleged
forty-five such examples.112 Comments by other groups in reply to
the NAB evidence indicated numerous, serious flaws in it includ-
ing: eighteen of the forty-five examples had been raised previously
in Senate or House hearings where they had been rejected as un-
persuasive; five other examples were taken out of context from
published books and articles; three of the examples actually re-
ferred to the same case; relevent "examples" were not actual ex-
amples, but were policy illustration cases; fifteen examples were
intended to demonstrate administrative and legal costs of Fairness
Doctrine complaints, but in reality the cost was either a postage
stamp or a phone call; numerous examples were vague, anonymous
claims that, for example, the Fairness Doctrine caused them to
avoid controversial issues.113 The House Report summarized its
view of the chill claim by stating that "The Chill argument that
the Fairness Doctrine chills speech is thus an attempt to clothe in
first amendment language a refusal on the part of broadcasters to
fulfill the commitments they gave in return for the free grant of a
valuable public privilege."114 Similar anecdoctal claims of a chil-
ling effect were presented in Red Lion.115 The Commission report
did not discuss why it found that evidence more persuasive now
than the Supreme Court had found it earlier.116
On balance, the 1985 Fairness Report is seriously flawed. In
the opinion of the House Committee, "[T]he Commission based its
criticism of the Fairness Doctrine more on a general desire to re-
move the government from the communications market and a
philosophical antipathy to the system of broadcast regulation laid
down by the 1934 Communications Act... rather than on an em-
pirical analysis of the broadcasting marketplace." 117 The conclu-
sion that the Fairness Doctrine disserves the public interest
110. House Comm. Rep., supra note 67, at 23.
111. Id. at 20-21.
112. Id. at 20-22.
113. Id.
114. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65, at 32-33.
115. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
116. House Comm. Rep., supra note 67, at 21.
117. Id. at 6.
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requires evidence other than the 1985 Fairness Report to be
convincing.
Broadcasting and Press: Functional Equivalents?
The FCC's recent first amendment argument against the
Fairness Doctrine concludes that broadcasting should be treated as
the functional equivalent of the press under the first amendment.
It argues that the standards of professionalism in broadcast jour-
nalism are equal to those of the print media." 8 Thus, the Com-
mission believes that the public interest in diverse, contrasting
viewpoints would be better served by a broadcasting industry no
longer subject to the Fairness Doctrine."19
Broadcasters want status equal to the print media. It is diffi-
cult to assess whether industry hostility to the Fairness Doctrine
emanates from its genuine burdens or from broadcasters' powerful
sense that they are being treated as second-class professionals
under the first amendment. This ambiguity is illustrated by the
results from a recent state-by-state survey of broadcast managers'
and professionals' responses to the announced ending of the Fair-
ness Doctrine. 12 0 A large majority described its value in symbolic
terms, citing it as a seal of approval on their view of themselves as
deserving equal status. 12 1 Far fewer cited the doctrine as a practi-
cal burden to their daily work.12 2
It is important to note that Red Lion has not been taken as a
reference point by the Supreme Court in its resolution of a similar
issue in the press. In a 1974 landmark case, Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Company v. Tornillo,123 the Supreme Court refused to let
stand a Florida statute requiring equal space in the press to polit-
ical candidates to reply to "criticism and attacks on his record."'124
The Court took the position that any regulation of editorial con-
tent, even regulation intended to increase accountability to the
public, was an unacceptable encroachment on the publisher's indi-
vidual right to expression.125 Standing on its own, Tornillo gave
the individual owner's speech rights via the printed word a power-
ful free speech value when set against the access the statute
118. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, Syracuse, 2 F.C.C.
Red. 5043, 5047 (1987) (memorandum opinion and order).
119. Id. at 5052.
120. Official Reaction to Fairness Doctrine RepeaL The Good The Bad, and The
Ugly, Broadcasting, Aug. 10, 1987, at 60, 61.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
124. Id. at 244.
125. Id. at 258.
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sought to compel. The broadcast industry argues for application of
Tornillo standards to broadcaster speech.
The critical difference between Tornillo and Red Lion is that
the government does not play a large, affirmative role in creating
the conditions of the print industry as it necessarily does in broad-
casting. In print journalism there are powerful inhibitions against
breaching the wall separating the state from the editorial function.
The relationship of broadcasting to the state is fundamentally dif-
ferent. This difference was recognized by then Circuit Judge War-
ren Burger in Office of Communications of United Church of
ChriSt V. F :. . 126
A broadcaster has much in common with a newspaper pub-
lisher, but he is not in the same category in terms of public ob-
ligations imposed by law. A broadcaster seeks and is granted
the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the
public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened
by enforceable public obligations. A newspaper can only be
operated at the whim or caprice of the owners; a broadcast sta-
tion cannot. After nearly five decades of operation the broad-
cast industry does not seem to have grasped the simple fact
that a broadcast license is a public trust subject to termination
for breach of duty.12 7
Apart from broadcasting's fundamentally different relation-
ship to the state, other differences distinguish broadcasting from
newspapers. The primary purpose of broadcasting content is to en-
tertain; the primary purpose of the newspaper is to carry news.
Admittedly, newspapers increasingly attempt to entertain, but
they are still identified by "harder," more extensive, public issues
content.1 28 Broadcasting is dominated by its need to perform as an
entertainment venture, a need which sharply limits on-air time for
news content. 2 9 This difference affects the presentation of news
content and professional standards in broadcast journalism. The
place of news and public issues presentation is far less secure in
broadcasting than in print journalism, not because the public is-
sues broadcast professionals lack professional commitment, but be-
cause the function of the broadcast outlet is fundamentally
different from print.130
An interesting illustration of the different commitment to
the news function is the fact that newspapers have accepted a reg-
126. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
127. Id. at 1003.
128. Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs, The Emergence of American
Political Issues: The Agenda Setting Function of the Press 89-106 (1977).
129. Id.




ulation that news content must make up 25% of total newspaper
space in exchange for the second-class postage rate for their pa-
pers.131 No similar proportion has ever been set in broadcasting,
and, if proposed, would be resisted for its interference with supe-
rior profits from entertainment. Since the news function is less se-
cure in broadcasting than in print journalism, the application to
broadcasting of the Fairness Doctrine expectation that controver-
sial public affairs be given adequate, unbiased coverage, is justified.
Journalistic standards and editorial integrity are also impor-
tant elements in assessing the equivalence of broadcast and print
journalism. Journalistic standards and editorial integrity are rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court as powerful protective factors in
helping to secure the first amendment right of the public to be in-
formed.132 However, only some broadcast outlets meet the stan-
dard envisioned by the Supreme Court. As a result, the protection
afforded by the standard to any particular sector of the public may
not actually serve the first amendment purpose. Where the broad-
caster for one reason or another fails to meet that standard, the
Fairness Doctrine was specifically formulated to provide one
means by which broadcasters could be required to provide access
for contrasting viewpoints on controversial public issues. Such ac-
cess helps to satisfy the first amendment interest in an informed
public.
It cannot be a legitimate first amendment intention that peo-
ple who find themselves in the ambit of the less professional me-
dia operation should enjoy lesser first amendment rights to
provision of public information. To accept a lesser provision of in-
formation for the reason that some broadcasters may fail in profes-
sional standards is to accept a lesser level of citizenship for those
listeners or viewers.
This is a particularly repugnant form of inequality since the
ability to act to correct other forms of inequality depends most di-
rectly upon informed consciousness.133 To say this is not to deny
that other additional factors contribute to different levels of public
awareness among people. Those differences require their own
analysis and solution. Nor does this deny that people rely upon
other sources of broadcast media for public information.
The view that unequal first amendment rights to public infor-
mation as a result of varying professionalism among broadcasters
131. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65, at 25 n.10.
132. F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of California 468 U.S. 364, 381-82 (1984).
133. See Alexander Meildejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers
of the People 25-28 (1960).
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is particularly injurious and repugnant to democracy recognizes
that broadcast media plays an extraordinary role in the provision
of public information. To give it pride of place with concern to
its impact on public information is to recognize its empirical
importance.134
Legitimate Regulatory Aims
Retention of the Fairness Doctrine itself remains a legitimate
policy goal. It is unlikely that the new leadership at the FCC will
be as ideologically driven as the leadership during these years of
attack on the Fairness Doctrine. The intense debate over the
whole regulatory framework characteristic of this period of leader-
ship should have laid the groundwork for a more coherent ap-
proach by the FCC in its administration of the Fairness Doctrine.
The likelihood is very great that access and diversity problems will
seek resolution before the FCC, regardless of the formal existence
of the Fairness Doctrine. As a result there are public participation
and administrative benefits to maintaining a familiar policy frame-
work within which reconstruction can take place, rather than con-
struction of a new one under the public interest standard.
The public participation benefit lies in the fact that many
public issues interest groups and many individuals are familiar
with the outlines of the Fairness Doctrine process. If the policy
goal is broadened public participation in the discussion of the me-
dia, then retention of Fairness Doctrine framework will contribute
to that goal. Similarly, administrative benefits result from the ex-
perience within the FCC in its handling of the Fairness Doctrine
process.
Retention of the Fairness Doctrine promises some benefit to
the broadcaster as well. A legitimate complaint of the broadcast
industry has been lack of guidelines by which to help them judge
the unusual situations, even though most of the time the work of
the broadcast journalist will proceed on the basis of professional
journalistic standards. In fact, the FCC did prepare a new Primer
on Fairness which was virtually ready for distribution in 1981.135
It has never been distributed. The Primer on Fairness clearly out-
lines in ordinary language Fairness Doctrine principles along with
practical examples.36 It indicates to the public when and how to
register a complaint, and indicates to the broadcaster the steps that
can be taken in order to respond to Fairness Doctrine requests.
134. Richard Joslyn, Mass Media Elections 190-91 (1984).
135. Senate Comm. Rep., supra note 65, at 32.
136. Id. at 110-161.
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Full circulation of it without further delay would do much to
lower the level of uncertainty, and legitimate level of irritation,
among broadcasters.
If retention of the Fairness Doctrine becomes impossible,
what is likely to emerge to address the disparities inherent in the
licensing system? The public interest standard in broadcasting
still stands as the beginning point for discussion of the relationship
among broadcaster, the state and the public. The opponents of the
Fairness Doctrine have gone to great lengths to point out that the
removal of the doctrine is not intended to remove the underlying
notion of a public interest obligation. 3 7 It is unlikely that the
problems the Fairness Doctrine sought to cure will disappear with
the disappearance of the Doctrine. Instead, it is likely that issues
involving access and bias will seek solution under the broad public
interest standard of the 1934 Communications Act.' 38 In a recent
submission to the FCC, the NBC network has discussed precisely
that possibility.139 In an even more explicit move, the American
Civil Liberties Union specifically proposed an expansion of the
public interest standard in response to the threatened full demise
of the Fairness Doctrine.140
Conclusion
The Fairness Doctrine is a broadcasting regulatory policy
which evolved through actions of the FCC, Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the courts. The doctrine sets out a two-part standard of
public accountability for broadcasters based on a government grant
of license to use the airwaves. First, it asks that broadcasters
devote a reasonsable amount of time to controversial public issues,
and second, that they present conflicting viewpoints about those
issues.
The Doctrine derives from the fundamental inequality be-
tween those who control access to the airwaves and those who are
denied access, and inequality which arises from scarcity of spec-
trum space. Those who are denied access have interests in access
137. "I would remind all licensees that our obligation to serve the public interest
through programming remains.... This decision [to abolish the Fairness Doctrine]
did not remove the bedrock trustee obligation; in fact, it's implicitly stated in our
document [spelling out the end of the Fairness Doctrine]." FCC Commissioner
Tony Quello, Proceedings, FCC, Aug. 4, 1987, cited in Special Report, "The Decline
and Fall of the Fairness Doctrine" Broadcasting, Aug. 10, 1987, at 23, 33.
138. 47 U.S.C. 307(a). The relevant language describing a public interest stan-
dard is the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."
139. See Hearings on H.R. 1934, supra note 24, at 67.
140. See id. at 66.
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to information on public issues and to hear diverse viewpoints on
those issues. The Doctrine aims to assure those interests.
This article has examined some aspects of the recent attack
on the Fairness Doctrine, particularly the claims that the idea of
spectrum scarcity is not now a valid description of airwave use,
that the Fairness Doctrine actually subverts its own policy goals,
and that broadcast journalism dealing with public issues should
have first amendment protections equivalent to the print press.
This analysis concludes that scarcity of spectrum does exist.
The main argument against the existence of scarcity-that broad-
caster voices have multiplied substantially over the last twenty-
five years-is irrelevant since multiplication does not itself pro-
duce diversity of viewpoints. The underlying policy goal is to set a
public standard for license holders, whatever their number, so as
to discourage biased presentation of public issues. That goal still
requires the Fairness Doctrine or its equivalent.
The claim that the Fairness Doctrine subverts its own policy
goals is drawn largely from a single FCC document, the 1985 Fair-
ness Report. That document is seriously flawed, relying mainly
upon undocumented, anecdotal broadcaster claims about problems
with implementation of the doctrine. The conclusion that the
Fairness Doctrine disserves the public interest requires evidence
other than the 1985 Report on Fairness to support its case.
Another strand in the attack on the Fairness Doctrine is the
argument that broadcasting should be treated as the functional
equivalent of the press under the first amendment for the reason
that professionalism among broadcast journalists is at the same
level as the print press. It is argued that those standards of profes-
sionalism will assure that controversial issues will be covered in an
unbiased way. This analysis concludes otherwise.
Broadcasting has some things in common with newspapers,
but stands in a different relationship to the public through its use
of a limited public resource. Therefore, standards for broadcast
operations can legitimately be drawn from sources other than pro-
fessional codes developed from private newspaper operations. An
equally important distinction justifying non-equivalence is the dif-
ferent role of news and public affairs coverage in broadcast opera-
tions compared to newspapers. The place of news and public
affairs coverage is less secure in broadcasting than in print journal-
ism because the primary function of broadcasting is entertainment.
Reliance on professional standards alone to assure unbiased cover-
age of controversial public issues is inappropriate in view of the
public obligation of broadcasters and unmindful of the greater in-
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security of news and public affairs programming in broadcasting
compared to newspapers.
The Fairness Doctrine, or an equivalent, remains a legitimate
policy goal. It is a familiar and useful way to express the idea that
broadcasters are meant to serve the public interest as well as their
own interests while in possession of a publicly granted right to
broadcast. The problems addressed by the Fairness Doctrine are
not created by it. Rather, they are created by the unequal rela-
tionship between those who control access to the airwaves and
those who do not. Greater equity is needed in that relationship.
The Fairness Doctrine attempts to do that through its emphasis on
the obligation of the broadcaster to pay attention to controversial
issues and on the obligation to provide free access for viewpoints it
fails to present. The Fairness Doctrine should be reexamined and
reinstated as a framework for coping with the difficult issues of
equal access, as well as for diversity in broadcasting.

